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The internationalisation of enterprises is one of the essential ways to strengthen the compet-
itiveness of ﬁrms from developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005c: 3). Strong growth in outward
foreign direct investment (OFDI) from developing countries has become the distinguishing fea-
ture of the twenty-ﬁrst century. This OFDI ﬂows from state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth
funds (SWF) as well as private enterprises operating as multinational companies from a home
base or as free-standing companies. Multinational corporations have commenced activities since
the 1960s by moving operations to resource-rich, low-cost labour and capital markets (Wilkins,
1970; 1974; 1988; Jones, 1994; 2005). The ﬁrst wave of OFDI during the 1960s and 1970s was
motivated by eﬃciency and market-seeking factors. This wave was dominated by ﬁrms from
Asia and Latin America. A second wave of OFDI followed in the 1980s, led by strategic asset-
seeking enterprises from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea (Dunning et al., 1996;
UNCTAD, 2005b: 3s). Since the 1990s China, Brazil, India, Russia (the so-called BRIC coun-
tries) Malaysia, Turkey and South Africa are among the countries expected to add signiﬁcantly
to OFDI growth (UNCTAD, 2005c: 4). The ﬂow of investment funds from developed countries
was expected, but the reverse trend displayed the emerging capacities in countries and ﬁrms
outside the core of the international economy, which challenged the dominance of developed
countries and companies from developed countries. These developments have prompted sev-
eral questions: how do developing country ﬁrms succeed in entering global markets? Do these
ﬁrms improve their competitiveness through OFDI? This paper investigates this phenomenon
f r o mt h ee x p e r i e n c eo fS o u t hA f r i c a . T h ee m ergence of EMNC (Emerging Market Multina-
tional Corporations) prompted extensive analysis and debates about the nature of and motives
for EMNCs, but has also led to more in-depth analysis of speciﬁc country characteristics and
ﬁrm-speciﬁcr e a s o n sf o rO F D I .
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The internationalisation of enterprises is one of the essential ways to strengthen the competitiveness
of ﬁrms from developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005c: 3). Strong growth in outward foreign direct in-
vestment (OFDI) from developing countries has become the distinguishing feature of the twenty-ﬁrst
century. This OFDI ﬂows from state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds (SWF) as well as
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1private enterprises operating as multinational companies from a home base or as free-standing com-
panies. Multinational corporations have commenced activities since the 1960s by moving operations
to resource-rich, low-cost labour and capital markets (Wilkins, 1970; 1974; 1988; Jones, 1994; 2005).
The ﬁrst wave of OFDI during the 1960s and 1970s was motivated by eﬃciency and market-seeking
factors. This wave was dominated by ﬁrms from Asia and Latin America. A second wave of OFDI
followed in the 1980s, led by strategic asset-seeking enterprises from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore
and South Korea (Dunning et al., 1996; UNCTAD, 2005b: 3s). Since the 1990s China, Brazil, India,
Russia (the so-called BRIC countries) Malaysia, Turkey and South Africa are among the countries
expected to add signiﬁcantly to OFDI growth (UNCTAD, 2005c: 4). The ﬂow of investment funds
from developed countries was expected, but the reverse trend displayed the emerging capacities in
countries and ﬁrms outside the core of the international economy, which challenged the dominance
of developed countries and companies from developed countries. These developments have prompted
several questions: how do developing country ﬁrms succeed in entering global markets? Do these
ﬁrms improve their competitiveness through OFDI? This paper investigates this phenomenon from
the experience of South Africa. The emergence of EMNC (Emerging Market Multinational Corpo-
rations) prompted extensive analysis and debates about the nature of and motives for EMNCs, but
has also led to more in-depth analysis of speciﬁc country characteristics and ﬁrm-speciﬁcr e a s o n sf o r
OFDI.
Is South African an “emerging economy”? The most commonly used deﬁnition of emerging mar-
kets in management literature is that emerging economies are “low-income, rapid-growth countries
using economic liberalisation as their primary engine of growth” (Hoskinsson, 2000: 249). This deﬁn-
ition includes 51 rapid-growing developing countries in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (as
identiﬁed by the International Finance Corporation), as well as another 13 economies in the former
Soviet Union and China (as identiﬁed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development),
but excludes South Africa. Eden describes the core characteristics of these economies “as dynamic
economies, with fundamentally changed institutional environments after the early 1990s when liber-
alization, privatization and deregulation were experienced as policy shocks, and as economies suﬀer-
ing from weak market-based institutions, especially property rights and legal infrastructure” (Eden,
2008: 333—334). Amighini et al. (2009) use “developing” and “emerging” country interchangeably
when assessing the origin of MNEs. Other authors place South Africa squarely in the category of
“emerging markets”. Goldstein and Prichard (2009) and Goldstein (2008) include South Africa in
the discussion of emerging market MNEs. The UNCTAD literature refers to South Africa as an
“emerging market” and a “developing” economy (WIR09: 22). The World Bank classiﬁes South
Africa among “upper middle income” countries (World Bank, 2000: 334). South Africa does not ﬁt
comfortably into these categories and should be described as a “unique” example of an “emerging”
or “developing” market because of its peculiarities (Klein and Wöcke,2007; Goldstein,2009).
The permanence in the reversal of the direction of MNC activities since the beginning of the
twenty-ﬁrst century has prompted a growing literature on emerging market MNCs or EMNCs. (See
Sauvant (2008); Ramaruti & Singh (2009); and Dick and Merrett (2007).) While the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shows an increase in European contribution to
OFDI stock from 49.5% in 1990 to 57% in 2006, and a decline in USA contribution from 24,3%
to 19.1%, the contribution by emerging markets/ developing countries rose from 8.3% in 1990 to
12.8% in 2006 (Ramuruti & Singh: 15). By 2008 the OFDI from developing countries rose to 16%,
the largest share of global OFDI (UNCTAD WIR09: 16—17). While Africa was a net recipient of
FDI amounting to US$86,7 billion in 2008, OFDI rose to US$9,2 billion in 2008 (UNCTAD WIR09:
B1, 247). The rising trend in OFDI from developing countries is explained by reference to global
market liberalisation and privatisation in developing countries. In seeking solutions to the economic
problems of developing countries, including Africa (Madison, 2007: 231—237), OFDI is explored as
a mechanism to enhance the proﬁtability and eﬃciency of EMNCs (UNCTAD, 2005b: 4—5).
In the discourse on why and how EMNC rose so rapidly, the OLI hypothesis of ﬁrm expansion
was used widely. Ownership (O) advantages (ﬁrm speciﬁc resources) and Location (L) (host country
2natural resource endowments) are Internalised (I) to improve ﬁrm eﬃciency and competitiveness,
rather than exploiting those advantages in other markets through arms-length transactions. From
this enhanced position of strength, Dunning (1993: 2000) identiﬁed a set of motives for OFDI.
These include: market-seeking investments targeted to access to third markets; eﬃciency-seeking
investments to improve eﬃciency through specialisation; resource-seeking investments seeking nat-
ural resources unique to speciﬁc foreign locations; and strategic asset-seeking investments to add to
the existing proprietary resources of the ﬁrm. Rugman (2007) argued that ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages
(FSA), complemented by country-speciﬁc advantages or CSAs (Rugman, 2006), which resembled the
O and the L advantages in the OLI model, determined international expansion of ﬁrms. Dunning
later adjusted the OLI model by incorporating alliance capitalism and ﬁrm networks in ownership
advantage — ownership is augmented by incorporating knowledge shared in networks and alliances
(Dunning, 1995, 2000, 2006). The organisational structure of internationalising ﬁrms subsequently
displayed new organisational forms — no longer only the hierarchical mode of integration, based on
the transaction cost theories, but through alliances and networks constructed new forms of own-
ership domains. Utilising these networks and alliances, ﬁrms internationalised their operations by
seeking strategic assets to augment their existing proprietary resources. Institutions’ importance in
strengthening CSAs into each variable of the OLI hypothesis, was gradually acknowledged (Dunning
& Lundan, 2008; Dunning & Zhang, 2008).
The “static” approach to EMNCs was amended by the view that “... internationalization
becomes a strategy aimed at strengthening the ﬁrms themselves thanks to the accumulation of
resources previously not available” (Amighini et al., 2009: 5). Internationalisation is explained by
ﬁrms’ supplementing existing O by what Mattthews (2002) called a more dynamic acquisition of
capacity and experience to overcome latecomer eﬀects and technology gaps (see Aulakh, 2007: 237;
Goldstein, 2007: 81). This is an evolutionary view of the internationalisation process (Amighi et
al., 2009: 5; Matthews, 2002a, 2002b) in which Matthews show how ﬁrms without O that they
could exploit abroad, ﬁnd resources, internalise them and ﬁnally develop linkages or partnerships or
networks to leverage against the risks involved in such outward strategies. This led to the amended
OLI framework, the LLL framework — Linkage, Leverage and Learning framework. Amighi explains
the new LLL model as follows: “Within this framework, the global economy is described as a set of
resources available to ﬁrms and internationalization is deﬁned in a broader sense, as: ‘the process of
the ﬁrm’s becoming integrated in international economic activities”’(Amighi et al., 2009: 6). EMNC
operations are thus explained not as asset-exploiting at the outset, but as asset-exploring.
The LLL framework linked OFDI with the EMNC strategies. Firms in emerging markets establish
networks with foreign producers and learn from them (capability enhancement) — this amounted to
“experiential learning”. Firms in the developing country acquired knowledge, experience in equip-
ment manufacturing, joint ventures and participation in GVC. Depending on the ability of the
emerging market ﬁrm to internalise or “absorb” (“identify, assimilate and exploit”) the new skills,
technology or resources, the EMNC could then venture into the global market (Li, 2007; Lou and
Tung, 2007; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Renewed emphasis is hereby placed on country-speciﬁc
analyses and the Gerschenkron eﬀect, i.e. the ability of late-comers to access and take over advanced
technologies and catch up as fast as possible through linkages, collaboration and the leveraging of
resources.
The internationalisation of South African enterprises displays some idiosyncrasies as well as
alignment to international trends. The South African economy by 1950 was more advanced than
that of several nations included in the emerging market category, such as South Korea, China, India,
Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania (Buchheim, 2006: 53—54). The growing international isolation of South
Africa since the country walked out of the Commonwealth in 1960, right up until the early 1990s when
political changes took place, limited the development of international linkages. South Africa was
never entirely isolated from the global environment. The internationalisation of business enterprises
was contained by political isolation, sanctions, exchange controls and ownership restrictions, but
the domestic development of commerce and industry in an incubated space developed an adequate
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South Africa justiﬁes a careful analysis of the country-speciﬁc conditions (CSAs) that enabled strong
economic growth and internationalisation capabilities (FSA) unmatched by any other African state.
2 The South African context
Since the nineteenth century the diﬀerent colonies which later formed the Union of South Africa in
1910 had been integrated into the international economy through trade with Europe (Netherlands,
Germany, France), Britain and the USA (Müller, 1977: 86—90; 139—141; Schuman, 1951: 166—167;
Jones & Müller, 1992: 117). These relations characterised South African trade throughout the
twentieth century, despite the sanction years. The most important characteristics of the South
African economy, which impacted on the ability of South African ﬁrms to globalise operations,
are sustained relations with the European metropole and Britain, concentration of ownership and
sector control, and state intervention. The mineral discoveries integrated the emerging modern
South African economy closely to British and European capital. Diamond mining was consolidated
in Cecil John Rhodes’s De Beers Consolidated Mines in 1888 and the 124 gold mining companies
converged into four dominant companies by the early 1920s (Newbury, 1995: 3—29). The Anglo-
American Corporation (AAC), established in 1917, acquired the majority stake in De Beers in 1927,
leading to a dominant position in the mining industry ever since. Diversiﬁed investments by the
mining industry stimulated the development of the industrial sector in South Africa. The mines also
needed capital and ﬁnancial services. The mines established their own ﬁnance houses and bought
stakes in banks. Mining, ﬁnance and industry were closely interlinked, and primarily to British and
other European capital (Yudelman, 1983: 258, 278—279). By 1938 Afrikaner business control was
small: 8 percent of total turnover in commerce, 3 percent of manufacturing, 5 percent of ﬁnance, 1
percent of mining and 5 percent of aggregate turnover of the entire economy — the rest had been in
English-speaking control (Sadie, 2001: 28). By 1910 the South African economy was nevertheless
still a primary mining and agricultural economy (Schumann, 1940: 81, 88; Jones & Müller, 1992:
11; Feinstein, 2005: 115).
The third characteristic of the economy was state intervention and protection. In the context of
protectionism in the Cape Colony and the ZAR during the late nineteenth century, the South African
government introduced union-wide tariﬀ protection from 1912 to 1993. This protection by means
of tariﬀs, import quotas and sectoral subsidies protected local industries. These industries were pri-
marily in the hands of foreign capital, which stimulated domestic policies of the South African state
to put “South Africa ﬁrst!” This implied that South African interests were to be paramount to Com-
monwealth interests in all respects, and not subject to Britain. The sense of independence, despite
alignment to the Commonwealth, served as a unique incentive towards economic self-suﬃciency.
Protection boosted industrialisation, but so did the establishment of several state-owned industrial
enterprises (SOE). In 1928 the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa (ISCOR) was estab-
lished to ensure the production of aﬀordable, accessible steel and iron for the growing industrial
economy. In 1923 the Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESCOM) was established
to ensure suﬃcient energy supplies for the growing economy. In 1940 the Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC) was established to assist industrial development through capital, expertise and
management consultancy (Jones & Müller, 1992: 168—172; Feinstein, 2005: 120—121). In 1950 the
South African Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol) was established to produce petroleum from coal.
International pressure was mounted against South African domestic policies at the United Nations
by the Non-Aligned Movement led by India (Verhoef, 2003: 88—90). International pressure intensi-
ﬁed the drive towards self-suﬃciency and protection1. An advanced industrial sector, dependent on
1Goldstein (2009:248) is misleading readers by blaming domestic protectionist policies and the rise of SOEs
on policies “to create jobs for Afrikaner workers”. Economic self-suﬃciency through structural diversiﬁcation de-
manded state involvement. This strategy was closely followed in Japan and several countries in South East Asia.
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sector and FDI, developed. Business and industry developed with close reciprocal ties to the former
colonial power, Britain, and other Commonwealth and European countries. In the period of rapid
international economic growth between 1945 and 1970, South African ﬁrms increasingly operated
within the LLL paradigm by leveraging resources from outside and slowly becoming integrated in
international activity, learning from developed country ﬁrms doing business in South Africa. While
in Australia and New Zealand the settler populations were more content with the British connection,
the “South Africa ﬁrst” policies drove demands for political sovereignty and South African ownership
of a meaningful portion of the South African economy. This had a profound impact on economic and
industrial development. Until the 1950s industries in South Africa were still ineﬃcient and heavily
dependent on the foreign exchange earnings of the mining sector (especially gold) to ﬁnance vital in-
dustrial raw materials imports. Lumby noted: “Consequently, the massive and diversiﬁed industrial
structure that has been developed in South Africa was unable to ﬁnance its own expansion. The
signiﬁcantly higher price for gold during the late 1970s provided South Africa with a windfall which
enabled her to delay the process of substituting secondary industry for the primary sector, but did
not obviate the ultimate need for such substitution. Hence the pronounced emphasis upon the need
to stimulate the development of export industries became part of the major strategy whereby the
government hoped to cut the Gordian knot which tied the expansion of South African industry to
the primary sector” (Lumby, 1983: 244; also see Feinstein, 2005: 180).
Protection, concentration and state intervention nurtured the development of the most diversiﬁed
industrial economy in Africa, but by the 1970s it had become ineﬃcient and uncompetitive. The
growth between 1940 and 1973 could not be sustained in a relatively isolated domestic market without
a comprehensive policy on human capital development to supply in the needs of a technologically
advanced industrial sector. By the 1970s a “structural break in economic performance” became
visible: real GDP per capita, real output in gold mining and the mining of other minerals, agriculture
and manufacturing declined. Output per worker, output per unit of capital and real ﬁxed capital
formation dropped from 1973. The average annual rate of growth of real manufacturing output
dropped from 7 percent between 1948 and 1974 to 1.6 percent between 1974 and 1994 (Jones, 2002;
Feinstein, 2005: 180, 202, 221; Van Dyk, 2003: 127—133). By 1979 the manufacturing sector imported
R7 billion worth of goods and exported goods valued at R3 billion — the shortfall of R4 billion was
ﬁnanced by mining earnings abroad (Yudelman, 1983: 278). Attempts to reform the labour market
by legalising trade unions, improving access to training and scrapping employment reservation in
the early 1980s could not overcome the structural ineﬃciencies in manufacturing. Global market
liberalisation (see Yegin & Stanislav, 1998: xv—xvi) and strong export-led growth from emerging
markets dwarfed the South African industrial sector.
Ironically, by 2007 South Africa had become the leading OFDI nation in Africa, with nine
companies in the top 100 non-ﬁnancial MNCs from developing countries (ranked by foreign assets).
South Africa is the only African state in those ranks. The top performer is Sasol at number 22
(WIR, 2009: A.11: 231—233; UNCTAD, 2005c: 6). What is the explanation for this?
*Gwynne,1990:63,175-198;Hewitt et al,1992:110,132)The leading industrialists such as W J Laite, who put pressure
on the government to introduce protectionist policies, were Englishmen, the main beneﬁciaries of industrial protection
were both entrepreneurs and employees. Afrikaners never dominated the industrial sector (Lumby,1983: 200—201).
By the late 1970s Afrikaner-controlled enterprises contributed 18 percent to the mining sector, 15 percent to man-
ufacturing, 16 percent to commerce, 25 percent to ﬁnance and 38 percent to professions. The aggregate Afrikaner
contribution to the private sector economy, including agriculture, in 1975 was 27,5 percent and excluding agriculture
20,8 percent (Sadie, 2001:28).
53 Internationalisation of South African enterprises: general
trends
The need to enhance competitiveness was the most signiﬁcant driver of the globalisation of South
African enterprises. Macro-economic motives stem from the termination of political isolation in
1990 and economic liberalisation, which commenced with monetary liberalisation in the mid-1980s
(Verhoef, 2009: 172—176). Liberalisation oﬀered enterprises opportunities to internationalise opera-
tions and gain access to more and cheaper capital to ﬁnance expansion, for example through dual
listings on international bourses, and to expand outward from a saturated domestic market. Access
to the global value chain, markets, natural resources and technology, the possibility of diversifying
operations and participating in global trade channels and taking advantage of global investment
opportunities all drove internationalisation (UNCTAD, 2005a: 3, 8; UNCTAD 2006b: 5; Gelb, 2005:
202; Klein & Wöcke, 2007: 320).
Oﬃcial SARB data on OFDI does not reﬂect reinvested earnings or long- or short-term capital
invested abroad, but the trend of investment in equity is clear: SOE OFDI had risen sharply
between 1998 and 2000, but since then declined. SOE from South Africa invested primarily in
infrastructure projects. The IDC acquired minority equity stakes in joint ventures with the Mozal
Aluminium smelter in Mozambique; Escom entered in joint ventures with the Mozal project as
well as telecommunications service providers in Lesotho; and Transnet’s subsidiary South African
Airways acquired a 49 percent stake in privatised Tanzania’s national airways (UNCTAD, 2005a:
9). Expansion of the banking sector followed actively after banks were permitted in 1994 to invest
abroad (Singleton & Verhoef, 2010). The growth in direct equity investment by the banking sector
rose dramatically to R8,6 billion in 2000, representing an annual average growth of 278,8 percent.
Since the initial strong outward performance, this OFDI had slumped to well below the 1990 levels.
The only sustained OFDI activities were those of the private non-bank sector. In 1990 a substantial
OFDI was made, but then OFDI showed a gradual and steady increase until 2007, after which a slight
reduction was posted for 2008. The contribution of SOEs and the banking sector is insigniﬁcant
compared to the OFDI by the non-bank private sector. Market liberalisation occurred in the domestic
market after South Africa signed the Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations in 1993, and
removed tariﬀ and quota protection, which had protected South Africa’s industrial sector. Only
enterprises well positioned with competitive advantage in production eﬃciency, and access to capital,
technology and management, could beneﬁt from this. A limited number of private sector enterprises
were favourably positioned to sustain and expand operations. Despite the inherent weakness of
the industrial sector referred to above, some enterprises were capable of extending their operations
internationally. OFDI by the non-bank private sector rose by 6,98 percent annual compound growth
between 1990 and 2008, compared to negative growth of ODFI by the banking sector.
The rising ratio of OFDI to GDP since 1990 shows the growing internationalisation of South
African business. Total direct equity investment as a proportion of GDP rose gradually from 3,53
percent in 1990 to 25,52 percent in 2008 (see Table 1). This represents an 86 percent increase, and
does not reﬂect the full position, since the OFDI of companies listed in London as their primary
listing do not submit to the SARB. The internationalisation of South African business compares
well with that of Australia. In 1990 Australian outward stock was 9,8 percent of GDP and in 2003
26,4 percent. South African OFDI was 3,53 percent of GDP in 1990, but by 2003 the SA ratio was
still well below the Australian ﬁgure at 12,64 percent. By 2008 South African ODFI had reached
the level of Australian OFDI in 2003, namely 25,52 percent (Dick & Merrett, 2007: 25).
The most important aspect of OFDI by the non-bank private sector is that the bulk of these
investments target developed markets, not developing markets, as was explained by Khanna and
Palepu (2006). The historic links with the UK and Europe made them the preferred markets.
By 2005 European markets were the recipients of 81,24 percent of direct equity investments from
South Africa, while the OECD accounted for 87,48 percent. Africa received only 8,19 percent of
OFDI equity investments, although this ratio is increasing. This distribution had changed to the
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OFDI in direct equity investments; 54,8 percent went to European nations, 7,35 percent to North
and South America, 21,7 percent to Africa, 10,7 percent to Asia and 4,6 percent to Australia (SARB,
2006, 2009). South African business is therefore beginning to expand into the emerging markets of
Asia, Oceania and Africa. The historic network of the OECD/UK is slowly diverging into a new
network of the emerging markets in the South-South alliance and the “comrade/liberation struggle”
network in Africa. The geographic direction of EMNCs from South Africa does not comply with the
Uppsala model of Johansson and Vahlne (1977), which argued that ﬁrms from developing countries
expand ﬁrst through exports to neighbouring ethnically similar countries, then to neighbouring non-
ethnically-related countries and only much later to more distant “developed” markets. This was also
the Investment Development Path (IDP) thesis of the 1980s (Dunning, 1981, 1986). If the former
colonial power and the European base of the white minority population is seen as the “ethnically
similar” entity to which South African enterprises exported, then the theory holds for the period
before 1994, but the theory does not hold for the post-1994 South Africa. Perhaps the fact that
South African ﬁrms were primarily in the hands of white owners explains the geographic direction of
OFDI immediately after 1994. South African OFDI is currently displaying expansion into countries
further away from their home base and “those further away in terms of psychic distance” (Tolentino,
1993: 364). The “neighbours” of South African enterprise are African markets, which are diﬀerent in
character from the UK/OECD markets historically targeted by them. The change in the dominant
“culture” in South Africa after 1994 has had a profound impact on internationalisation strategies of
enterprises.
Most OFDI from South Africa takes place by means of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Gold-
stein, 2009: 253—257; Klein & Wöcke, 2007: 324—330; UNCTAD, 2005a: 6). New investments are
made, but this is a minority strategy. New investments in Africa were relatively small (below R7m
— or US$1m) and primarily market seeking, taking commodities in demand to communities deprived
of properly functioning markets (Grobbelaar, 2008). The M&A wave was stimulated by the interna-
tional unbundling trend of the late 1980s and 1990s. In South Africa the ﬁrst major conglomerate
unbundling exercise was the unbundling of Gencor by Sankorp in 1993 (Verhoef, 2009: 154—157;
UNCTAD, 2005a: 3). Subsequent unbundling exercises to improve focus and strategic direction,
opened up more M&A opportunities in the domestic market. Better-focused business groups set
their eyes on acquisitions in expanded markets, which led to international M&As. The dominant
South African outward M&As by conglomerates were by Anglo American Corporation (AAC), South
African Breweries (SAB) and Old Mutual, but smaller deals were concluded by Sappi, Sasol, Billiton,
the MTN Group and Dimension Data (E&Y, 1998-2009). The most transactions and the largest
OFDI transactions occurred between 2000 and 2001. Since 2005 more inward FDI has occurred
(E&Y, 2009: 14, 23). AAC, SABMiller (after 2002) and Old Mutual secured primary listings on the
London Stock Exchange (with a secondary listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) (Economist,
10/12/98). The strategy of this move was to display managerial and performance professionalism,
improving focus by selling oﬀ non-core assets and thus gaining international investors’ acceptance as
sound, not too risky investments and a profoundly better track record than EMNCs from competing
emerging markets. Further OFDI by London primary-listed companies were no longer captured in
SARB statistics and therefore oﬃcial SARB OFDI statistics do not reﬂect the entire spectrum of
globalisation by South African enterprises.
4C a s e s t u d i e s
Some brief analyses were conducted on internationalisation strategies of leading South African OFDI
enterprises, SAB Sappi and Barloworld (Klein & Wöcke, 2007). Goldstein (2008) and Goldstein and
Pritchard (2009) oﬀered a general overview of the globalisation trend of South African companies.
The general assessment is that CSAs existed in each case, which, coupled with FSAs, provided South
7African enterprises with a competitive advantage in globalisation.
The ﬁrst big business from South Africa to move across the borders was SAB. In 1993 SAB
acquired a stake in the loss-making Tanzanian national brewer and then entered into an agreement
with the Castel group. A pan-African strategic alliance was formed. SAB operated in the south
and eastern parts of the continent and Castel in francophone or central, west and north Africa.
The expansion into African markets absorbed excess capacity and improved eﬃciency. SAB then
targeted the eastern European markets, starting with Hungary. In 1994 SAB moved into China and
established a dominant presence in ﬁve African countries, as well as in Poland, Russia, Romania,
Slovakia and the Czech Republic by 2000. In 2001 SAB expanded into Central America. By 2002
SAB was represented in 24 countries. In May 2003 SAB acquired a 100 percent interest from
Phillip Morris in the Miller Brewing Company in the USA. Since then, SAB has been registered
as SABMiller. In 2005 SABMiller became the second-largest brewer in Latin America after the
acquisition of Grupo Empresarial Bavaria, the largest drinks ﬁrm based in Colombia (Economist,
20/07/05; 21/07/05). SABMiller moved its primary listing to London in March 1999, to access more
hard currency for further expansion. The depreciation of the South African currency since 2002,
political instability in Zimbabwe and a lack of conﬁdence in African leadership were all reasons
to grow the business in global markets. UNCTAD ranked SABMiller in 2003 as a TNC from a
developing country in position 20 in terms of foreign assets and 18th in TNI (Transnationality
index),2 with a score of 55 percent. SABMiller’s foreign assets in 2003 were US$2,785 billion,
foreign sales US$2,433 billion and 15 450 employees in foreign employment (WIR, 2003). By 2008
SABMiller was no longer ranked as a developing country TNC in the non-ﬁnancial sector, but as
a TNC among the world’s top 100 non-ﬁnancial TNC’s. SABMiller is ranked in the 76th position,
with a TNI of 76 percent, foreign assets of US$25,139 billion, foreign sales of US$12,585 billion and
56 195 foreign employees (WIR, 2009: 229). SABMiller used the protected South African market to
develop expertise and excess capacity, but the limitations of scale and scope in the isolated domestic
market resulted in massive diversiﬁcation into non-core industrial activities. Once isolation was
ended, SAB sold oﬀ non-core assets, and globalised through M&As. SABMiller used its expertise
to expand into developing markets in Africa and Eastern Europe, and then, after listing, made the
leap into developed markets. By 2008 SABMiller was no longer a South African company, and
earned the bulk of its income from outside South Africa — The Economist refers to SABMiller as a
“British-based ﬁrm” (Economist, 21/07/05).
While SABMiller initially moved into developing markets and then excelled in developed mar-
kets, South African enterprises engaged in rapid globalisation, and entered primarily into developed
markets. Some, such as Sappi, have a minority exposure in developing markets. The exposure
to OECD and other developed markets has remained remarkably stable since 2000 (Goldstein &
Pritchard, 2009: 257—260). AAC unbundled its industrial assets, strengthened its focus and then
merged with Minorco in 1998. AAC then listed on the London Stock Exchange as AAC Plc. The
subsequent restructuring of AAC entrenched the company more ﬁrmly in the OECD market and re-
duced exposure to the troublesome, politically volatile, South African mining industry. In 2008 AAC
Plc was ranked 56th among the world’s top 100 non-ﬁnancial TNCs, with a TNI of 83,7 percent.
The only other former South African company on that list was SABMiller. AAC internationalised
easily because of its sophisticated technological and managerial expertise since the 1920s. AAC was
by far the dominant listed company in terms of market capitalisation on the JSE since the 1930s,
until its exit to London. Superior resource endowments facilitated the development of a strong
mining/industrial sector in South Africa in which AAC was the most powerful. As soon as political
power shifted in South Africa, AAC sought less threatening and more stable markets, with less
exposure to the militant labour unions ﬁrmly entrenched in political power in South Africa. In the
words of Moletsi Mbeki, Deputy-Chairman of the South African Institute of International Aﬀairs,
the internationalisation of large companies can be seen as “political risk management” (Financial
2The Transnationality Index is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign assets to total assets;
foreign sales to total sales; foreign employment to total employment.
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In the case of Sappi (South African Pulp and Paper Industries) the company beneﬁted from
industrial protection policies, but the limited domestic market restricted opportunities for produc-
tion eﬃciencies on economies of scale. Organic growth in the domestic market made Sappi the
market leader. After acquiring Saiccor, the world’s single-largest producer of chemical cellulose in
1987, Sappi needed manufacturing expansion. Excess domestic capacity required market-seeking
expansion. Sappi commenced exports in the mid-1980s and in 1986 established Sappi International
to manage foreign sales, which rose to 50 percent of production. (www.sappi.com; Financial Mail,
6/2/04). Sappi embarked on aggressive international expansion through M&As: in 1991 ﬁve ﬁne
paper mills were acquired in the UK, specialised pulp services in Hong Kong were acquired, and in
1992 the company acquired control of Hanover Papier in Germany and listed on the London and
Frankfurt Stock Exchanges, followed by a listing on the Paris bourse. In 1994 Sappi acquired 75
percent of S.D. Warren, the world leader in coated paper in the USA and by 1997, after acquiring
Europe’s largest coated paper producer KNP Leykam, Sappi was the world’s largest producer of
coated paper and market leader in Europe, North America and Africa. In 1998 Sappi listed on the
New York Stock Exchange as well, but never shifted its primary listing overseas. In 2004 the expan-
sion into the Asian market occurred: Sappi acquired 34 percent in a Chinese joint venture Jiangxi
Chenming to build paper machines, a mechanical pulp mill and a de-inked pulp plant. By 2008
Sappi was the world leader in the manufacturing of coated wood free paper (Economist, 13/07/06;
www.sappi.com/Sappi web). In 2008 Sappi was ranked in the 50th position of non-ﬁnancial TNCs
from developing countries, with assets of US$4001 million, foreign sales of US$3 898, foreign employ-
ees numbering 9 802 (or 65% ) out of a total of 15 081 employees in the group. Sappi’s TNI is 67,2
percent — thus acknowledged as a truly global company. Sappi still has substantial operations in
South Africa, but utilised its managerial expertise and market leadership in the technology of coated
paper production developed and reﬁned in South Africa as an internationalisation strategy — ﬁrst
into the developed markets of Europe, the UK, Hong Kong, Germany and the USA, and ﬁnally into
China. Sappi did not expand into other developing markets, but operated in line with the Dunning
(1981) theory of world-class ownership advantages.
A similar internationalisation strategy was displayed by Barloworld, the industrial brand man-
agement company. Barlows was established in 1902 as a family business in England. The company
sold woollen goods and later expanded into engineering goods. In 1927 Barlows sold the ﬁrst Cater-
pillar tractor and soon other heavy engineering Caterpillar equipment. Barlows listed on the JSE in
1941 and soon diversiﬁed industrial operations in a way similar to other South African enterprises
in the 1960s and 1970s. Barlows listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1969 and acquired trading
operations in the UK, Botswana and Namibia. In 1970 Barlows acquired Rand Mines, which led
t oar a p i dd i v e r s i ﬁcation into extensive mining, industrial, property and electrical equipment. This
was the characteristic of all the large mining and industrial concerns in South Africa in the 1970s
— international expansion was restricted, but domestic M&As allowed rapid organic growth. Bar-
lows’ international expansion had commenced as early as the 1980s, when acquisitions were made
in Belgium, Spain and Portugal. These global exposures provided the springboard from which Bar-
lows catapulted itself internationally after 1990. Following the international trend of conglomerate
unbundling and refocusing on core business, Barlows disposed of its mining interests and embarked
on further international acquisitions in the engineering equipment brand sector. New acquisitions
were made in Australia and the USA and distribution networks extended to Siberia. Barlow Rand
changed its name to Barloworld in 2000 to reﬂect the global footprint of the enterprise. The op-
portunities for expansion had already run out for Barlows in South Africa in the 1970s and in the
twenty-ﬁrst century Barloworld set itself the target of 75 percent income and 66 percent sales from
international markets by 2003 (Business Report, 2000; Klein & Wöcke, 2007: 328—329). Since 2000
Barloworld expanded operations in the USA, Australia, the UK and China. Barloworld remained
a South African company, but it “owns and maintains the British Ministry of Defence’s entire ﬂeet
of more than 4500 pieces of material-handling equipment worldwide” (Business Report, 2003). By
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prise. The three goals are: co-branding activities in which leading international brands are marketed
and distributed, manufacturing, marketing and distribution of its own brands, and ﬁnancial services
operations (leasing and insurance) to support the distribution function (Klein & Wöcke, 2007: 329).
In 2005 Barloworld was ranked 21st on the TNI index for non-ﬁnancial companies from developing
countries, with transnationality at 51,6 percent, but 32nd in terms of foreign assets. Barloworld’s
foreign assets rose from US$409 billion in 2001 to US$2,030 billion in 2008. Barloworld’s ranking
in foreign assets had dropped to 83rd in 2008 and its transnationality to 68th position, with 41, 1
percent. In 2008 Barloworld’s foreign assets as a proportion of total assets was 45,1 percent. Foreign
sales as a proportion of total sales were 43 percent (WIR, 2009: 233).
The performance of Barloworld underlines the observation that most South African MNCs’ glob-
alising conduct conforms with that of MNCs from developed countries, i.e. seeking markets for
advanced industrial commodities and services in developed markets. The other rapidly internation-
alising South African MNCs listed under the top 100 non-ﬁnancial TNCs from developing countries
are Gold Fields Limited, Naspers Limited, Steinhoﬀ International, the MTN Group Limited, Datatec
and the Bidvest Group. Gold Fields is a gold mining group expanding into gold and precious min-
erals mining in other parts of the world; Naspers is the oldest Afrikaans company in media and
communication technology; Steinhoﬀ International is a diversiﬁed consumer goods company; MTN
is the mobile telecommunications company and Datatec is the information technology company. All
of these enterprises utilise and distribute advanced technology, commodities aimed at the middle-
and higher-income consumer markets — or, in the case of Gold Fields, expanded on the strength
of its competitive advantage in deep-level mining. None of these enterprises are seeking to access
developing markets with low-technology, high labour-intensive commodities, or seeking to access
low-cost markets. All of these enterprises engaged in market- as well as capital-seeking strategies
to overcome the limitations of the domestic capital market in order to develop growth capacities.
These enterprises internationalised rapidly — within the scope of three and ﬁve years.
Financial services enterprises were slow to internationalise. FDI inward into the ﬁnancial sector
was slow after foreign banks were allowed to invest in local banks or establish operations in South
Africa. The price of these enterprises as well as the political risk discouraged foreign investors.
The ﬁnancial enterprises actually engaged in OFDI from this market into global markets, but on
a comparatively limited scale. By 2009 revenue from foreign operations by South African banks
and ﬁnancial services was less than 10 percent. Their foreign loans and advances rose from 4,3
percent of total loans and advances in 1994 to 11.8 percent in 2008. Foreign banks’ business in
South Africa remained below 9 percent of total loans and advances of the entire banking sector.
South African banks opened international oﬃces very quickly: ABSA established new subsidiaries
or bought ﬁnancial services companies in Jersey and the British Virgin Islands. First National
Bank established oﬃces overseas and obtained trade and ﬁnancial services subsidiaries in the British
Virgin Islands, in Guernsey Island, Ireland and Hong Kong. Investec Bank obtained foreign interests
in ﬁnancial services companies in the British Virgin Islands, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Hong
Kong, Australia, the Jersey Islands and other parts of the UK, the Netherlands, the USA and
Mauritius. Nedbank extended interests beyond its long-standing London oﬃce to Hong Kong, Malta
and Mauritius. Standard Bank spread its interests to the UK, Hong Kong, Liberia, the United
Arab Emirates and Russia. Rand Merchant Bank invested in Plessey Australia Paciﬁc. These new
ventures represented a wide variety of ﬁnancial services companies, investments subsidiaries and
some other related concerns such as health care companies. By the end of 1999 South African banks
had established further interests in Latin America (Standard Bank established oﬃces in Argentina,
Brazil, Peru and Colombia), The People’s Republic of China, Singapore, Germany, Switzerland Italy
and Iran (SARB, 1999: 116—117). The foreign expansion in 2000 included establishment of interests
by Nedbank in India and by Standard Bank in seven African countries, Turkey and Australia.
Nedbank, First Rand Bank and PSG Investment Holdings established subsidiaries or representative
oﬃces in Australia (SARB, 2000: 120—121). The most notable trend in the foreign expansion of
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Nigeria, the DRC and Angola), the Cayman Islands, Canada and Australia and more extensively
into Guernsey Island. In Ireland the proliferation of South African banks led to the signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Bank Supervision of SARB and the
banking regulatory authority of Ireland in 2000, on the regulation of such operations (SARB, 2000:
26). The number of approvals by the SARB for the acquisition of foreign banking interests by South
African banks rose from 40 in 1997 to 68 in 1999, then dropped to 43 in 2000, 34 in 2003 and 19
in 2005. The Barclays Bank acquisition of a 51 percent interest in ABSA in 2005 was primarily
motivated by the Barclays desire to gain access to the ABSA footprint in Africa. Despite the global
presence of South African banks, the bulk of their revenue remains ﬁrmly rooted in the domestic
market (Verhoef, 2009b: 185—195).
Even broad-based ﬁnancial services concerns struggle to internationalise. After demutualisation
Old Mutual (OM) moved its primary listing to London. OM proceeded rapidly with M&As in
Europe, the USA and in 2005 in Scandinavia. OM relied on its capital strength, but failed to
achieve proﬁtability, because the company did not have unique technical abilities to add value to the
market. Expansion into the USA market was a failure and OM withdrew in 2009 (E&Y: Mergers and
Acquisitions, 2009: 23; Old Mutual Annual Reports, 1998—2009). A much more cautious approach
was taken by Sanlam, the life assurer that also demutualised in 1998. Sanlam waited until 2001
before embarking on an explicit internationalisation strategy. Sanlam cautiously expanded into the
UK, Africa and India by distributing ﬁnancial products appropriate to those markets. (Sanlam
Annual Reports, 2000—2009).
The highest-ranked South African conglomerate in the top 100 non-ﬁnancial enterprises in 2008
is Sasol, the chemical giant. In 2008 Sasol was ranked 22nd in terms of foreign assets of the top 100
non-ﬁnancial TNCs and 82nd in terms of its TNI (31,6 percent) (WIR, 2009: 231). This company
has a unique dimension, which justiﬁes more systematic and detailed attention: i.e. Sasol was an
SOE, but privatised itself and then developed into a leading international player and world leader
in the synthetic fuel (CTL and GTL technology) industry.
5 SASOL — from national champion to global player
Sasol was established in 1950 to adapt the German Fischer-Tropsch process for the production of fuel
from coal for the South African climate, quality of coal and stage of technological development. Sasol
chemical engineers registered the unique Sasol Synthol process in 1953, developed the technology
commercially and applied it without much adjustment until the 1970s (Rahmim, 2003). The ﬁrst fuel
from coal was produced in 1955 at the initial Sasol plant in Sasolburg. Production technology was
expensive and highly subsidised by the South African government.3 Sasol was a strategic industry
3The protection aﬀorded to Sasol consisted of an allowance paid to Sasol for every litre of fuel manufactured from
local raw materials (coal). After 1979 the oil price rose substantially to a level in January 1985, when the payment
of the subsidy was suspended. Another protection mechanism was introduced in 1989, for 70% of Sasol’s petrol and
30% of its diesel production. This was based on an internationally desired ﬂoor price for crude oil. Should the ﬂoor
price of crude oil drop below the protection level ﬁxed in the agreed $/barrel price, Sasol would be compensated 0,78
US cents/litre for every dollar the dollar price settled below the protected level. After the expansion into Sasol 2 and
Sasol 3 the state had to create space for the expanded production capacity of Sasol. The government struck a deal
with the oil companies whereby they shut down some capacity at their reﬁneries and bought 91% of Sasol’s output in
order to let Sasol into the market. In return Sasol was not allowed to own any petrol stations and could only market
the remaining 9% directly into the market. The companies would buy the synthetic fuel from Sasol at the prevailing
In-Bound Landed Cost (IBLC — the set price at which reﬁneries sold reﬁned products to the liquid fuel wholesaling
and marketing companies). Product-swapping between the companies to reduce costs already existed. The PBLC
was also set artiﬁcially high by using the Bahrain and Singapore markets. This eﬀectively acted as a tariﬀ on all
reﬁned fuels — synthetic or not. The IBLC included a 6c/litre transport cost for piping crude from the coast to the
interior. Sasol did not have to pay this, since it was located in the interior. This gave Sasol an advantage over other
reﬁneries. The lower returns suﬀered by the other oil companies meant that they negotiated a levy of 3c/litre , which
was rebated to the oil companies for buying Sasol synfuel (Lambrechts, 1998: 60-63; Engineering News, 19-25/6/98):
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oil reserves. The fuel production at Sasol remained cost-ineﬃcient until late in the 1980s, but state
subsidies protected the industry (Verhoef 2003: 188, 196—199; Lambrechts, 1998: 5).
Two factors have inﬂuenced the operational focus of Sasol since the early 1970s. The ﬁrst was
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isolation and sanctions following the UN Security Council threat of mandatory sanctions against
South Africa posed a very real geo-political problem. Sasol expanded into Sasol 2 and Sasol 3 by the
mid-1980s. Simultaneous diversiﬁcation in downstream chemical production opened the doors to
the globalisation of Sasol research, technology and business operations. The restructuring of Sasol
was eﬀected by its listing on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange in 1979. Privatisation freed the
company from protection by government (Bates, 1981), and accessed capital for expansion. The
listed status enabled Sasol to formulate an expansion strategy outside the sheltered SOE context.
Sasol diversiﬁed operations into downstream chemicals production, mining and related activities, oil
reﬁning and fuel marketing and the production of synthetic fuel. A fundamental restructuring of
operations into ﬁve subsidiary companies followed. Sasol Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd (SCI) was
the chemicals vehicle; Sasol Synthetic Fuels (Pty) Ltd (SSF) was the vehicle for the production of
synthetic fuels; Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd was the vehicle co-ordinating the diversiﬁed mining activities
of Sasol, and Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd was responsible for oil reﬁning and fuel marketing. Research and
development activities were housed in Sasol Technologies (Pty) Ltd (ST). International expansion
of synthetic fuel operations led in 2000 to the establishment of Sasol Synfuels International (SFI)
and Sasol Petroleum International (SPI).
The research by chemical engineers in ST at the synthetic fuel division of Sasol was ultimately
responsible for the development of leading strategic technology that provided Sasol with its competi-
tive and environmental advantage. Sustained expenditure on R&D since 1951, but more aggressively
since the 1970s, in collaboration with international research institutions, kept Sasol abreast of CTL
and petrochemicals technology. Annual provisions for R&D averaged about R5 million, but by the
early 1990s this provision leapt to in excess of R55 million and reached R66 million in 1995 (Annual
Report, 1995: 70). In 1996 Sasol declared that the company engaged increasingly in “projects aimed
at improving Sasol’s international competitiveness, at an approved cost of R1 800 000” (Annual Re-
port, 1996: 16).
Sasol’s R&D expenditure rose steadily from the mid-1990s and reached a peak of 1,3 percent
of total expenditure in 2001, when the synthetic fuel GTL technology was developed and reﬁned.
R&D expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure declined until 2004. In 2009 the R&D expen-
diture stood at 1,3 percent of total expenditure, showing the supportive role of new technological
development in the company.
In 2008 yet further international accreditation was received for the innovative research by ST
in developing fully synthetic jet fuel (Sasol Review, 2009: 26). Sasol’s R&D expenditure made the
company the largest R&D institution in South Africa. The beneﬁts of the R&D were exported to
the global market via the global operations of Sasol. This constituted the competitive advantage
of Sasol and facilitated its internationalisation, a strategy usually characterising developed market
MNCs.
6 New technology for international fuel competitiveness.
The privatisation of Sasol and the political changes after 1990 opened international markets to Sasol’s
commodities and intellectual property. The ﬁrst step was a conscious and strategic business decision
to improve proﬁtability by reducing its dependence on synthetic fuel production, the international
“Everything you wanted to know about South Africa’s energy policy, but were afraid to ask Minister Maduna.”
The Star: Business Report, 10/12/98: “Sasol terminate supply pact.”; Business Day, 10/12/98: “Sasol to end supply
deals.” Chemical Marketing Reporter (1996). New York, 6 May, 249 (19): 9-10 “Sasol talks deals on its technology.”
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means of a new Sasol Advanced Synthol (SAS) reactor, which was easier to operate, cheaper to run
and more eﬃcient in producing clean gas. The SAS reactors were installed at Sasol 2 and Sasol 3 in
Secunda in 1992 and by 1996 all synthol reactors at Secunda were replaced by SAS reactors (Collins,
2007: 123). This technology-improved eﬃciency reduced production costs when tariﬀ subsidies were
phased out.
When South Africa signed the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1993, the government
appointed the Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force (LFITF) to investigate the tariﬀ protection awarded
to SASOL since listing in 1979. Soon the highly regulated domestic fuels industry was deregulated.
Sasol welcomed this development and announced in December 1999: “Such an approach will aﬀord
all participants in the industry, particularly the small players and previously disadvantaged groups,
the opportunity to grow and transform in order to become more competitive” (Engineering News,
17-25/6/98; The Star Business Report, 10/12/98; Business Day, 10/12/98). A conﬂuence of the
impacts of the domestic political transition, global market transformation and international trade
deregulation thus helped shape the business strategy of Sasol by the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst
century.
A conscious business strategy of globalisation of operations emerged at Sasol at the beginning of
the new millennium. The chairman, Mr Paul Kruger, announced in the 1999 Chairman’s statement
that, “Sasol has clearly signaled that it is becoming more of an international player and events in
the rest of the world are therefore of greater importance to it” (Sasol Annual Report, 1999: 6).
The new business strategy was twofold: develop new international business and joint ventures in
collaboration with international partners, diversify operations into established former markets and
develop new markets oﬀshore. This aspect of its new vision was based on the distribution of the
existing product base. The second aspect of Sasol’s business strategy was to use its ground-breaking
Slurry Phase Distillate (SPD) technology) (Chemical Marketing Reporter, 1996: 9) to manufacture
new-generation diesel from gas. This unique Sasol gasiﬁcation process was the most eﬃcient in
the world (Van Dyk, Keyser, Coetzer, 2004: 3—4). From May 1993, Sasol plants in South Africa
produced 3,2 million m3/synthetic gas per hour in 9 gassiﬁers (Van Dyk, Keyser, Coertzen, 2004:5).
The signiﬁcance of this gassiﬁcation process was that Sasol produced the world’s purest diesel — a
major environmental advantage over conventional diesel products (Rahmim, 2003: 9; Sasol Annual
Report, 2000: 56—57). This was a major competitive advantage to Sasol internationally.
In May 1996 Sasol announced that it would advance its SPD technology internationally (Chemical
Marketing Reporter, 1996: 10). The global positioning of Sasol was inevitable: businesses built
around natural resources are usually global, because they serve international customers in advanced
markets, they seek alternative sources of resources due to the saturation or cost of domestic materials,
and because such “companies move up the value chain, selling branded products or oﬀering solutions
to niche markets” (Khanna and Palepu, 2006: 67). The improved SPD technology oﬀered the
opportunity for the global development of gas-to-liquid technology (GTL).
The worldwide search for new fuels to minimise waste and pollution (Chemical marketing report,
1996: 9) made the GTL technology attractive but it needed suﬃcient stocks of natural gas. New
unexplored natural or “stranded” gas deposits were located outside the developed world (Taylor,
2007: 51—53; Economist, 20/04/06). The leading Sasol technology was internationally acknowledged
and oﬀered a unique advantage, since it converted methane gas to synthetic gas. Methane gas is
one of six gases targeted under the Kyoto Protocol (Taylor, 2007: 35; Wilhelm, Simbeck, Karp,
Dickenson, 2001: 145—146). The main problem in the application of this innovation lay in the high
cost. Fleisch et al. argued that the cost of the chemical conversion process was high, and therefore
inhibitive for its development as a serious alternative to oil (Fleisch et al., 2002: 3—8), but the Sasol
SPD reactor has been widely acclaimed for improving the economics for producing Fischer-Tropsch
diesel fuel (Norton et al., 1998: 4—5). Sasol partnered with the Danish Haldor Tropsøse company
(Wilhelm et al., 2001: 145; Fleisch et al. 2002: 6—8) and with cash-rich Chevron Texaco to perform
the process commercially (Engineering News Round, 242 (24); 22; Pump Industry Analyst July
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and exclusive vehicle for the application of the Sasol SPD technology, then pioneered commercially
eﬃcient applications of GTL technology on a global scale.
The ﬁrst application was the Oryx GTL plant in Ras Laﬀr a ni nQ a t a r .Aj o i n tv e n t u r ew a ss i g n e d
with Qatar General Petroleum Corporation and Phillips Petroleum of the USA for the construction of
a new-generation plant (Sasol Annual Report, 2000:47; Sasol Press Release: http://www.sasol.com,
16/04/02). The GTL Oryx plant went into production in 2007 (Sasol Annual report, 2009:2; Econo-
mist, 6/01/05). The next initiative was the construction of the 34 000 bpd GTL plant at Escavros
River in Nigeria using the same technology applied in Qatar. Sasol also entered into an agreement
with the government in Mozambique to transport natural gas by means of a 865-kilometre pipeline
from Mozambique to Secunda (at the Sasol 2 and Sasol 3 plants in Mpumalanga) to use gas as
primary feedstock in the production of synthetic fuel. The Sasol Mozambique Natural Gas Project
saw the construction of a central processing facility at Temane in Mozambique. Natural gas has
been imported from Mozambique since 26 March 2004 (DME, 2005: vii; Sasol Annual Report, 2004:
36; 2002: 43). Sasol also took its global pioneering coal-to-liquid (CTL) technology to China and
India, where CTL plants are planned for future use of coal deposits (Sasol Annual report, 2009: 51).
7 Chemicals international
Sasol used the increased capacity at Sasol 2 and Sasol 3 to diversify into sophisticated chemicals
production to develop a niche area as a platform for international expansion (Verhoef, 2003: 193).
Sasol diversiﬁed its downstream chemical production by establishing a separate chemicals division,
Sasol Chemicals. Sasol Chemicals’ contribution to the total operating proﬁt increased from 20%
in 1991 to 31,2% in 1995 (Sasol Annual Report; 1992: iv; 1996: 9). The breakthrough came in
1995 when SCI acquired Schümann Waxes in Hamburg, Germany, to form Schümann Sasol AG.
By 1998 this company controlled 10 percent of the world waxes market. The second strategic
acquisition was in 1997: Sasol acquired DHB Holdings Inc of Rosemount, Minnesota, with its wholly
owned subsidiary Continental Nitrogen and Resources Corporation (CNR). Sasol then developed new
explosives for DHB, the so-called EXPAN products, which improved safety in mines by virtually
eliminating air-pollution fumes during blasts (Mining Weekly, 1997: 13).
SCI’s acquisition in 2000 of Condea transformed SCI from a South African-based chemicals
group into a global player in the chemicals industry. Condea was the largest global producer of raw
materials and intermediaries for the detergent industry and had seventeen production facilities in
the USA, Netherlands, Germany and Italy. The acquisition of Condea increased the Sasol Group’s
non-African revenue from 21 percent in 2000 to 47 percent in 2001. The new entity was Sasol Wax
GmbH. Sasol wax oﬀered the synergies needed for increased production and distribution of chemical
products to the East Asian markets which SCI had developed since the late 1990s. Dedicated sales
and marketing oﬃces were opened in Dubai to grow Sasol’s solvents business in the Middle East
(Sasol Review, 2001: 33; Gulf News, 30/5/99). Sasol Polymers entered into three joint ventures
with Asian companies in Malaysia and China to increase the production of polymers. These joint
ventures were highly successful and by 2008 supplied an outlet to new products ﬂowing from South
Africa into the growing Chinese market. In November 2007 an ethane cracker was established as a
joint venture with the Iranian National Petroleum Company to supply new polymers and ultimately
to export them to the rest of the world. By 2009 the SCI cluster contributed more than 40 percent
to the Sasol Group’s total turnover (Sasol Review, 2009: 57—71).
The eﬃciency and proﬁtability of Sasol improved since active internationalisation. Table 3 shows
the strong performance in proﬁtability ratios since 2000. The severe downturn in international
business in 2008/2009 is reﬂected in the proﬁtability of Sasol in 2009, as shown in Table 3. Two
important observations are reﬂected: the global downturn impacted negatively on Sasol’s operations
and proﬁtability as a global player in 2009. The proﬁtability of Sasol improved markedly since
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slumped in 2009 to 17%. ROA (net) rose from 38,1% in 2000 to 42,6% 2008 before the slump down to
35,8 percent in 2009. Sasol succeeded in maintaining a fairly stable operating margin between 2000
and 2008 — around 24,4 and 26 percent (excluding 2009). The extensive international operations
contributed to safeguarding the Group’s operations.
As the leading South African-based TNC in the top 100 non-ﬁnancial companies of the develop-
ing world, Sasol realised that global competitiveness in technology, productivity and entrepreneurial
drive were the keys to sustained performance. After privatisation R&D drove technological develop-
ment and diversiﬁcation to strengthen the platform for global expansion. In 2006 Sasol listed on the
New York Stock Exchange to access USA capital markets. Sasol did not relinquish its primary listing
on the JSE, but acted “like a multinational enterprise and transfer(ed) its technology and services
abroad with its investment” (Wilkins, 1974: 166—167). As a true national champion, Sasol utilised
the country-speciﬁc advantages of state ownership, protection, capable management and access to
suﬃcient natural resources to establish itself and grow domestic competitive advantage. State reg-
ulatory protection was removed after 1994, but Sasol had established itself as a private enterprise
long before that and expanded operations globally through the transfer of its unique internationally
leading technology.
8 Internationalisation of successful big business from South
Africa
A strong, well capitalised and concentrated mining industry, well connected to the European metro-
pole, formed the demand for industrial goods. The industrial sector thus developed in close connec-
tion to the mining industry and the European metropole. After the formation of the Union in 1910,
strong domestic nationalism and demands for sovereignty, “South Africa ﬁrst” policies stimulated
protectionist industrial and agricultural policies, which favoured the development of local industries.
Protectionism, tariﬀs and state intervention through the state-owned industrial and utilities sector
mutually dependent on the foreign exchange earnings of the mining sector, characterised the South
African economy. This sectoral subsidisation of the industrial sector in South Africa is not unique
to this country. It was not the case in resource-scarce South East Asian countries, but deﬁnitely
happened in Australia. The co-existence of the mining and industrial sectors in South Africa led
to concentration of business, which was exacerbated from the 1960s when international political
pressures mounted. The highly concentrated domestic business sector encouraged the development
of managerial capacities conducive to big business operations in developed markets. Isolation sup-
pressed competition, but it did not in South Africa lead to stagnation and backwardness. Interna-
tional sanctions intensiﬁed from the 1980s. The South African state intervened further by means
of exchange controls to protect the economy. This behaviour Jones describes as “Government as
Home”, where the strategic importance of an economy serves as justiﬁcation for state intervention
and protection (Jones, 2005: 218—221). The political and institutional environment favoured the
development of domestic conglomerates. The inward-looking economic policies encouraged economic
development in the home economy that would later serve as a precondition for domestic ﬁrms to
compete abroad (Dunning, 1981).
The isolation of South Africa, although never comprehensive or completely paralysing, oﬀered
business the opportunity to take advantage of the Rugman FSAs such as ownership of the core
industries, CSAs such as natural resources (minerals, land, labour, relatively favourable climate)
entrepreneurship and long-standing exposure to the global market to establish itself. International
sanctions impacted negatively on domestic production eﬃciency, technological development and
international competitiveness, but business gained by investing in manufacturing facilities, marketing
systems and modern management, which ensured ultimate success after the end of “isolation” (Dosi,
Nelson and Winter, 2000). Advanced managerial capacity was developed in big SOEs and big
15business a result of “incubated concentration” in the economy and sustained international links.
This served as a CSA which developed FSAs in all the conglomerates discussed. Although inhibited
from global expansion through domestic regulation, South African businesses developed important
ownership advantages or FSAs in the form of entrepreneurship, production innovation (Sappi, SAB
Miller, Sasol) and R&D capacities, market knowledge of and historic links to developed markets
and advanced managerial skills. This contradicts the conventional view of developing country ﬁrms
expanding primarily into “low and medium research-intensive industries” (Barnard, 2008: 52; Dick
& Merrett, 2007: 5—6). The nature of globalisation and target markets of South African MNCs
correspond with the globalisation trends of OECD and other developed economies’ MNCs (Goldstein,
2009: 141).
The opening up of South African markets after 1990 gave South African business the opportunity
to capitalise on the international market participation of mining and ﬁnancial industries since the
nineteenth century. Only the manufacturing sector was a latecomer to international participation.
Sappi, SABMiller and Sasol needed global expansion and access to capital and markets to develop
production eﬃciencies in the competitive advantages of their businesses. These companies then
developed “alliance” capitalism and networks as described by Dunning in his adaptation of the OLI-
model, to develop manufacturing capabilities and innovative modern management structures based
on FSAs for globalisation when markets opened. The excess capacity built up during isolation and
sanctions, created a strong need for supply opportunities in international markets. This development
signiﬁed the dynamic approach to the OLI model: internationalisation became strategy for ﬁrms
to strengthen themselves by accumulating resources formerly inaccessible to them, such as markets,
capital, technology and more favourable labour markets. Strong management was cultivated in
trying domestic contexts, such as discriminatory government policies, cultural and racial diversity
and social unrest and violence. Management acquired experience in dealing with political risk by
developing a foreign presence. The exceptional ability of management to transform critical domestic
conditions into positive ﬁrm performance was rapidly recognised internationally (Klein & Wöcke,
2007: 332). The good management of South African ﬁrms facilitated the establishment of more
and closer linkages, leveraging of resources and technology as well as learning frameworks (the new
LLL model), exactly what Sapppi, SABMIller and Sasol had done to globalise operations. Firms
observed the global economy in the words of Amighi as a set of resources available to assist in the
process of becoming integrated in international economic activities (Amighi et al., 2009:6)
The opening up of the South African market after 1990 also posed a serious threat of inward
competition by foreign business, but the companies discussed in this paper relied on their ownership
advantages to develop themselves into leading global players, primarily into high-income developed
markets. The concentration of South African business, the protectionism of the past and isola-
tion nurtured the development of core skills and knowledge, thus providing the initial advantage
for international expansion. These advantages could not sustain that expansion indeﬁnitely, but
the capacity to adapt to global markets and new demands (the dynamism of the LLL model) en-
sured sustained international success and further expansion. Innovative technologies or proprietary
production processes were the prime drivers in both Sappi and Sasol. The strategies were similar:
M&As in their narrowly deﬁned industrial sectors, starting with small take-overs and followed by
more substantial transactions.
Two factors were most important in the internationalisation decisions of South African conglom-
erates: access to capital for expansion and minimisation of risk. Witt and Lewin described this
as “misalignment between ﬁrms’ needs and home country institutional environments in spurring
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)” (Witt & Lewin, 2007). Dual listings on international
bourses emerged as a strategy for South African conglomerates to achieve both. The established
international networks of South African managers and business assisted globalisation. The existing
alliances with business in developed countries, as well as the subsequent listings, facilitated interna-
tionalisation and minimised risk. The Black Economic Empowerment policies of the current regime
constitute a serious infringement of market forces and place a burden on local business. The suc-
16cesses with the foreign listing strategies were embedded in existing competitive advantages, such as
technology (Sappi and Sasol), managerial expertise (Sappi, SABMiller, AAC, Sasol) and market-
ing capacity (Sasol, SABMiller). These characteristics compare favourably with those of developed
country MNCs since the 1970s.
It is ideological populism to ascribe the success of South African conglomerates in post-1990
global markets to discrimination, the dualistic nature of the economy and the privileged position
of the mining industry (Goldstein and Pritchard, 2009). The history of these ﬁrms show that an
entrepreneurial spirit and good business leadership manifested in the successful management of
enterprises capable of dealing with market imperfections. Not all South African enterprises that
engaged in international operations were successful. The SOEs, such as Transnet and Escom, and
some SMMEs only expanded their business activities into neighbouring countries or SADC members
(Gelb, 2007: 202—203). Conglomerates were successful in developing a critical mass in the protected
isolated domestic market, which developed management capabilities, innovative technologies and
distributive capacities capable of entering global markets the moment political restrictions were
removed. Home market protection developed domestic “monopolies” that expanded into markets
with similar levels of development and demand characteristics. Networks based on history, language,
culture and family ties contributed to the familiarity and accessibility of those markets. No single
homogeneous internationalisation strategy emerged for all successful South African conglomerates,
but the common denominator was excellent entrepreneurial and management capacity. The most
important aspects of South Africa’s historical entrepreneurship culture that enabled the successful
internationalisation of diversiﬁed conglomerates can be identiﬁed as visionary idealism of individual
managers; the ability to combine the speciﬁc competitive advantages of speciﬁc ﬁrms in foreign
markets; the ability to assess risk in foreign markets; the ability to adapt strategies to deal with
cultural diversity, racial diﬀerences and class stratiﬁcation in consumer demand; the ability to assess
the nature of the market correctly; the ability to ﬁnd synergies with foreign businesses; the ability to
capitalise on technological advantages developed under protection for new applications; the ability
to instil conﬁdence in investors to attract capital and the ability to manage a diverse labour force
eﬀectively. OFDI from domestic EMNCs enhanced their eﬃciencies and competitiveness, which
stimulated further operational globalisation. Sasol is the local “champion”. The Sasol Group of
companies operates in some 30 countries on all continents, but maintained its primary listing on the
JSE. The next decade of business globalisation outward from the South African market will depend
on whether domestic economic policies accommodate the openness of global business or contain
them by the ideological bias of the current regime as had been the case under the pre-1990 political
dispensation.
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by banking sector – 
equity capital 
Direct Investment by 
Private non-bank sector- 
Equity capital 
Total direct equity 
Investment (1) 
1 as % of GDP 
1990  0  299  36,912  38,463  3,53 
1991  0  175  5,574  44,171  4,11 
1992  0  196  7,348  54,329  5,16 
1993  0  206  8,630  61,020  5,72 
1994  0  285  12,911  67,698  6,15 
1995  0  473  18,746  84,991  7,49 
1996  0  1,039  25,809  114,013  9,63 
1997  23  1,349  33,539  113,170  9,31 
1998  302  4,946  38,233  157,385  12,88 
1999  714  6,683  48,419  203,036  16,24 
2000  870  8,636  61,754  244,653  18,79 
2001  50  3,588  65,917  213,184  15,94 
2002  75  2,364  55,331  189,911  13,69 
2003  81  2,605  58,909  180,507  12,64 
2004  78  1,972  75,773  220,036  14,74 
2005  108  745  82,756  238,490  15,17 
2006  141  651  121,907  354,254  21,35 
2007  187  267  140,839  448,629  25,63 
2008  202  127  116,314  463,143  25,52 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Time Series dataset. 
 
 
Table 2. R&D Cost,1994-2009: percentage of overall expenditure (Rm) 
 
Year  R&D  Capex spent 
Cash to suppliers 
& employees 
Total spent  % 
           
2009  1,325  15,672  96,776  112,448  1.2% 
2008  818  10,855  88,712  99,567  0.8% 
2007  745  12,845  68,907  81,752  0.9% 
2006  309  13,296  55,694  68,990  0.4% 
2005  188  12,616  49,080  61,696  0.3% 
2004  358  11,418  44,801  56,219  0.6% 
2003  461  10,968  48,699  59,667  0.8% 
2002  350  8,742  40,592  49,334  0.7% 
2001  380  4,095  25,294  29,389  1.3% 
2000  230  2,171  17,124  19,295  1.2% 
1999  147  2,348  14,438  16,786  0.9% 
1998  150  2,927  12,146  15,073  1.0% 
1997  108  2,617  11,229  13,846  0.8% 
1996  91  1,998  9,185  11,183  0.8% 
1995  66  1,480  8,052  9,532  0.7% 
1994  54  1,272  6,655  7,927  0.7% 
           
  5,780  115,320  597,384  712,704   
 
Source: Sasol Annual Reports, 1994-2009. 
25Table 3: Sasol Profitability, 2000–2009 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Return on 
Shareholder’s 
equity*  24,2  34,5  35,6  23,7  16,9  24,0  21,6  29,8  32,5  17,0 
Return on total 
assets**  24,1  26,6  25,5  17,77  13,3  18,2  18,5  24,2  26,9  18,7 
Return on net 
assets***  38,1  52,6  54,5  36,7  27,4  37,1  36,5  46,2  48,9  32,4 
Operating 
margin****  24,4  25,9  24,6  18,2  15,2  20,8  20,9  26,1  26,0  17,9 
 
Source: Sasol Annual Financial Statements, 2009:31. 
 
*  Attributable earnings ÷ average shareholders’ equity 
**  Net profit before finance expenses and taxation ÷ Average non-current assets ÷ average current assets 
***  Net profit before finance expenses and taxation ÷ Average total assets – average total liabilities. 
****  Operating profit ÷ turnover 
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